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Figure 3 | BMC Evolutionary Biology

Figure 3

From: Beneficial laggards: multilevel selection, cooperative polymorphism and division of labour in threshold public good games

Figure 3

Stable and instable fix points of the model and the position of the hysteresis point for different group sizes ( n ). Results from numerical and individual-based (IBM) simulations show the same results. Instable fix points (dashed line for numerical simulations, open red circles for IBM simulations) separate the interior stable fix points (thick lines for numerical and filled red circles for IBM simulations) and 0 cooperativeness in the system. a, Group size (n) is 5, the threshold values are (T) 5, 4, 3, 2, 1. b, the locations of the hysteresis points (i.e. the maximal cost where cooperation still can be a stable), with different group sizes (n). (♦: T = n-1; ▲: T = n/2).

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